The liability of a defendant in a criminal case depends upon proof of fault.
One of the most common fault element is the intention.
When the criminal complicity is under consideration i.e. when twomore people join a criminal enterprise to commit an offence, the statement does not change.
Thus, the mental state of both accessories and princi-pals should be consistent.
However, after Jogee, the current situation regarding the mental element of both accessories and principals has a risk that a new defacto disparity takes place.
This dissertation discusses how the disparity problem between the liability of accessories and prin¬cipals can be handled.
Moreover, it is adopted that this disparity leads to injustice in opposition to a claim that requiring different conditions for both the principals and accessories is a normal situation.
The dissertation's scope is only limited certain part of the law of criminal complicity.
As Andrew Simester has observed when accesso-rial liability is considered, there were two separate routes prior to the Jogee to attribute liability.
The first was the traditional way of accom-plice liability prescribed by s. 8 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861.
Pursuant to this section, ifan individual assistsencourages another to commit an offence, he becomes liable as a result of his actions.